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This paper investigates the  prevailing financial  regulatory structures  and impact of the 
current financial turmoil on banking performance in  four Asian economies: the  People's 
Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China. Both the PRC 
and Hong Kong, China  operate under a fragmented  financial regulatory structure,  while 
Singapore and Taipei,China  have integrated structures. We examine the role of an 
integrated financial regulatory structure in helping financial institutions mitigate the impact of 
the financial crisis, using financial indicators of banks’ capital structure and operating 
performance in these four economies between 2003 and 2008.  
Our analysis of the indicators reveals that banking performance under a fragmented financial 
regulatory structure is not worse than under integrated regulation. This implies that financial 
regulatory structure is not the main reason why Asian financial institutions suffered only 
limited losses from the current global financial crisis. However, given the growing complexity 
of  the global financial system, and the relative weakness of current financial regulatory 
structures in Asia,  this paper suggests that East Asian governments should refer  to the 
Lamfalussy Process in the European Union and set up an Asia Financial Stability Dialogue 
to facilitate policy coordination for regional financial sector stability and development. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The global financial turmoil originating from the United States (US) subprime mortgage market 
is deepening and broadening. Banks in the US and the European Union (EU) are threatened 
with liquidity shortage and huge investment losses. Conversely, commercial banks in Asia 
have been relatively unscathed. 
The impact of the financial turmoil on commercial banks in Asia can be seen in two aspects. 
First is the direct loss in investments. Subprime mortgage losses in Asia have totaled about 
US$19.5 billion, which accounts for approximately 1.95% of total capital in Asian banks; this is 
far lower than the 10.03% of total capital reported in the US (see Kawai, Lamberte, and Yang 
2008). 
Second is the change in capital structure and operating performance in Asian banks, which 
shows the indirect impact of the financial turmoil. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in Asian 
banks has maintained double-digit growth, except in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
The nonperforming loans (NPL) ratio has trended downward, while the coverage ratio has 
trended upward. Additionally, the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) in Asian 
banks continue to perform well (Tables 1–5). 
Table 1: Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets (%) 
  Economy  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
PRC  -5.9  -4.7  2.5  4.9  8.4  12.0 
Hong Kong, China   15.3  15.4  14.9  15.2  13.4  14.8 
India  12.7  12.9  12.8  12.3  12.3  13.0(Mar.) 
Indonesia  22.3  19.4  19.3  21.3  19.3  16.8(Nov.) 
Korea  11.1  12.1  13.0  12.8  12.3  10.9(Sep.) 
Malaysia  13.8  14.4  13.7  13.5  13.2  12.6 
Philippines  17.4  18.4  17.6  18.1  15.7  15.5(Jun.) 
Singapore  17.9  16.2  15.8  15.4  13.5  14.3(Sep.) 
Thailand  13.4  12.4  13.2  13.8  14.8  15.3 
Australia  10.0  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.2  10.9(Sep.) 
Japan  11.1  11.6  12.2  13.1  12.9  12.3(Sep.) 
US  13.0  13.2  12.9  13  12.8  12.5(Sep.) 
Source：IMF (2009). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Table 2: Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans (%) 
Economy  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
PRC  20.4  12.8  9.8  7.5  6.7  2.5 
Hong Kong, China   3.9  2.3  1.4  1.3  0.9  1.24 
India  8.8  7.2  5.2  3.3  2.5  2.3(Mar.) 
Indonesia  6.8  4.5  7.6  6.1  4.1  3.5(Nov.) 
Korea  2.6  1.9  1.2  0.8  0.7  1.1 
Malaysia  13.9  11.7  9.6  8.5  6.5  5.1(Sep.) 
Philippines  16.1  14.4  10.3  7.5  5.8  5.2(Jun.) 
Singapore  6.7  5.0  3.8  2.8  1.5  1.4(Sep.) 
Thailand  13.5  11.9  9.1  8.4  7.9  6.5 
Australia  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.5(Sep.) 
Japan  5.2  2.9  1.8  1.5  1.5  1.5(Sep.) 
US  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.8  1.4  2.3(Sep.) 
Source：IMF (2009). 
Table 3: Bank Provisions to Nonperforming Loans (%) 
Economy  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
PRC  19.7  14.2  24.8  34.3  39.2  115.3 
Hong Kong, China   NA   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
India  46.4  56.6  60.3  58.9  56.1  52.6(Mar.) 
Indonesia  112.4  110.8  68.6  78.3  87.7  98.5(Aug.) 
Korea  84  104.5  131.4  175.2  199.1  155.4(Sep.) 
Malaysia  53.1  55  59.1  64.6  77.3  86.9(Sep.) 
Philippines  51.5  58  73.8  75  81.5  84.1(Jun.) 
Singapore  64.9  73.6  78.7  89.5  115.6  119.9(Sep.) 
Thailand  72.8  79.8  83.7  82.7  86.5  . . . 
Australia  131.8  182.9  203  202.5  183.7  87.2(Sep.) 
Japan  29.9  31.2  28.1  28.8  26.4  24.9(Sep.) 
US  140.4  168.1  155  135  93.1  84.7(Sep.) 
Source：IMF (2009). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Table 4: Bank Return on Assets (%) 
Economy  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
PRC  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.7  1  17.1 
Hong Kong, China   1.9  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.9  2 
India  1  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.9  1.0(Mar.) 
Indonesia  2.6  3.5  2.5  2.6  2.8  2.6(Nov.) 
Korea  0.2  0.9  1.3  1.1  1.1  NA 
Malaysia  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.5  1.6(Jul.) 
Philippines  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.3  1.3  1.1(Jun.) 
Singapore  1  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.1(Sep.) 
Thailand  0.6  1.2  1.4  0.8  0.1  NA 
Australia  1.6  1.1  1  1  1  0.9(Jun.) 
Japan  –0.1    0.2  0.5  0.4  0.2  0.3(Mar.) 
US  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.3  0.8  0.3(Sep.) 
Source：IMF (2009). 
Table 5: Bank Return on Equity (%) 
Economy  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
PRC  ...   13.7  15.1  14.8  19.9  NA 
Hong Kong, China   17.8  20.3  19.1  NA  NA  NA 
India  18.8  20.8  13.3  12.7  13.2  12.5(Mar.) 
Indonesia  26.6  34.5  26.4  30.2  25.7  26.0(Aug.) 
Korea  3.4  15.2  18.4  14.6  14.6  NA 
Malaysia  15.6  16.7  16.7  16.2  19.7  NA 
Philippines  8.5  7.1  8.8  10.6  10.8  9.6(Jun.) 
Singapore  8.7  11.6  11.2  13.7  12.9  11.9(Sep.) 
Thailand  10.3  16.8  14.2  8.8  7.3  NA 
Australia  24.2  16  14.7  16.8  18.1  17.0(Jun.) 
Japan  –2.7   4.1  11.3  8.5  6.1  3.0(Sep.) 
US  15.0  13.2  12.7  12.3  7.8  3.3(Sep.) 
Source：IMF (2009). 
Why are Asian commercial banks less affected by the financial turmoil? This may be attributed 
to  a series of financial supervisory system  reforms  implemented after the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997. The Asian financial crisis was caused by the sudden influx of global hot money 
and relatively fragile banking systems. From 1997 to 2003, Asian countries launched reforms 
in their financial supervisory systems. Among these reforms, the evolution of the financial 
supervisory structure in the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Singapore;  and Taipei,China is most ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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notable. Since the beginning of the decade, these four Asian economies have become an 
important global economic zone, owing to phenomenal economic growth. The savings rate of 
citizens in these economies is relatively higher than in other economies, which contributes to 
the development of the bank system. Financial markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, China 
are also highly  globalized.  Their financial supervisory systems therefore serve as useful 
reference for financial supervision reforms being implemented in the US and the EU. 
This paper focuses on bank supervisory systems in the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; 
and Taipei,China, and analyzes how commercial banks have been influenced by the financial 
turmoil.  This study uses financial indicators of banks’ capital structure and operating 
performance during the period 2003–2008, to examine the role of an integrated financial 
regulatory structure in helping financial institutions mitigate the impact of the financial crisis.  
Both Singapore and Taipei,China have integrated financial supervisory systems，while PRC 
and Hong Kong, China  have  adopted  fragmented regulatory structures. The integrated 
financial supervisory system features a single universal regulator that conducts oversight and 
conduct-of-business regulation for all the financial services sectors. In contrast, the 
fragmented financial supervisory system is a legal-entity-driven approach. The legal status of 
financial institutions (for example, an entity registered as a bank, a security firm, or an 
insurance company) essentially determines  their regulator, from the perspective of safety, 
soundness, and business conduct.
1
Is an integrated financial supervisory institution better than a fragmented regulatory structure? 
There is no definite answer  to this question  in  the  literature.
 
2
                                                 
1 The Group of Thirty (2008) studied financial supervisory structures in 17 countries. Current structures for financial 
supervision are classified into four categories: Institutional, Functional, Integrated, and Twin Peaks. 
 Based on bank supervisory 
systems in 133 countries from 1996 to 1999, Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana, and Yago (2002) 
studied the relationship between different bank supervisory systems and bank structures and 
demonstrated that that there is no relationship between the two. Cihak and Podpiera (2007) 
argued that integration of the supervisory system is highly relevant in terms of acquiring high 
quality and consistent financial supervision. Due to the growing complexity of derivatives and 
financial markets, Masciandaro and  Quintyn (2009)  argued that a  fragmented regulatory 
approach would not be appropriate, and that an integrated structure should be adopted for the 
purpose of ensuring sufficient information. However, the United Kingdom’s integrated financial 
regulatory structure did not make it better equipped to deal with the impact of the current 
2 On the issue of choosing an appropriate financial supervision architecture, two main questions are often 
addressed. One is whether an integrated supervisor is better than a fragmented one. This is the main issue in 
this paper. The other is the role of central banks in the financial stability framework. This is not covered in this 
paper. Please refer to Herring and Carmassi (2008), Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009), and Nier (2009). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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financial crisis, compared to the US and the EU; this suggests that an integrated financial 
regulatory structure may not be relevant to hedging financial risk. Our own findings reveal no 
tangible evidence that an integrated financial regulatory structure is better than a fragmented 
regulatory structure in mitigating the current financial turmoil. It is likely that this issue will be 
continuously explored. 
Although the question of which financial regulatory structure would be optimal at the national 
level remains unanswered, global and regional cooperation in financial supervision should be 
strengthened to respond to the growing complexity and interdependence of global financial 
system. Due to differences in financial regulatory structures among Asian countries, this paper 
suggests that the current framework for Asian regional supervision coordination should refer to 
the Lamfalussy Process, an approach to the development of the financial service industry 
regulations used by the EU. Originally developed in March 2001, it is named after the chair of 
the EU advisory committee who created it,  Alexandre Lamfalussy. It is composed of four 
levels, each focusing on a specific stage of rulemaking. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the financial 
supervisory systems in PRC; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China, focusing on 
bank supervision in these countries. Section 3 analyzes the impact of financial turmoil on the 
commercial banks in these economies, using financial data from 2003 to 2008. Section 4 
discusses and analyzes financial regulatory reforms in the US and the EU, and provides 
suggestions for Asian cooperation on financial supervision. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  FINANCIAL AND BANKING SUPERVISION 
2.1  Financial Supervision in the PRC 
Financial supervision in the PRC operates under a fragmented financial regulatory structure 
(Figure 1). While most countries that have implemented reforms in the past 25 years tended to 
move towards an integrated or twin teaks approach, PRC did not. Under the previous 
regulatory structure, all financial supervision was consolidated within the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC), PRC’s central bank. Through a series of reforms over the past 25 years, PRC 
has shifted to an institutional approach, where banking, securities, and insurance are 
supervised by separate agencies. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 1: The Financial Regulatory Structure in PRC 
 
Source：G30 (2009).  
The PBC formulates and implements monetary policy, mitigates financial risks, and 
safeguards financial stability. Following the reform of the supervisory system and the creation 
of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the PBC no longer has a direct 
financial supervisory role. However, the Governor of the PBC is still a member of the State 
Council of China, which is the government’s executive body. As such, it continues to have 
considerable influence over the general direction of financial supervision. The State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is an agency within the PBC that manages PRC’s 
foreign exchange reserves. 
In 1992, the Securities Commission of the State Council and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) were established to supervise the stock market jointly with the PBC. 
These two institutions merged in April 1998 and took the name CSRC. The CSRC is 
responsible for supervising and regulating the securities and futures markets. Other major 
CSRC functions include supervising securities and futures firms, stock and futures exchange 
markets, publicly listed companies, fund management companies, securities and futures 
investment consulting firms, and other intermediaries involved in the securities and futures 
business; protecting investors’ rights and interests; and mitigating market risks. 
In 1998, the State Council established the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) as 
an agency to supervise,  regulate, and ensure the sound development of the insurance 
industry. Major responsibilities of the CIRC include formulating insurance industry policies, 
strategies, and plans; drafting laws and regulations regarding insurance supervision and 
regulation; examining and approving the establishment of insurance companies; supervising ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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insurance  business operations; and investigating  irregularities and imposing penalties  as 
needed. In 2005, the China Insurance Protection Fund was established; this is now under the 
supervision and management of the Insurance Protection Fund Council. 
In April 2003,  the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established to 
supervise and regulate the banking sector. According to the Banking Supervision Law, the 
CBRC’s responsibilities include supervising banks, financial asset management companies, 
trust and investment companies, and other depository financial institutions; approving new 
banking institutions; formulating prudential rules and regulations; and conducting a wide range 
of powers of examination, including off-site and on-site investigation. The CBRC is responsible 
for detecting risks in the banking sector and establishing an “early-warning system”. 
The CBRC is led by a board consisting of a Chairman, a Discipline Commissioner, and a 
General Secretary. As of 2008, the CBRC staff numbered 23,345. Its institutions totaled 
2,074,  including departments affiliated to Banking Supervision Commission, supervisory 
board, financial labor union;  36 Banking Regulatory Commissions;  300 branches of the 
Banking Supervision Commission;  and 1,735 supervisory agencies.  Their budgets are 
authorized by the PRC State Council. 
The CBRC’s supervisory standards are mainly based on CAMELs+, with departments and 
their responsibilities working independently as follows: 
  Supervisory Rules and Regulations Department（Research Bureau).The Supervisory 
Rules and Regulations Department is responsible for drafting regulations and 
provisions for the supervision of banking institutions. The department drafts laws and 
administrative regulations and makes proposals for drafts or amendments. It 
investigates important issues in the reform, development,  and supervision of the 
banking industry. It is also responsible for proposing policies on the development of 
the banking industry. 
  Banking Supervision Department I. The Banking Supervision Department I handles 
the day-to-day supervision of state-owned commercial banks. 
  Banking Supervision Department II. The Banking Supervision Department II handles 
the day-to-day supervision of joint  stock commercial banks  and  city  commercial 
banks. 
  Banking Supervision Department III (overseeing foreign-fund banks).The Banking 
Supervision Department III handles the day-to-day supervision of locally incorporated 
foreign bank subsidiaries. 
  Banking Supervision Department IV (overseeing policy banks and postal savings 
institutions). The Banking Supervision Department III handles the day-to-day 
supervision of policy banks and postal savings institutions. 
  Non-bank Financial Institutions Supervision Department. This department handles ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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the day-to-day supervision of non-bank financial institutions, including financial asset 
management companies,  trust companies,  financial leasing companies,  monetary 
brokers  firms, and lending  companies, but excluding  securities, futures,  and 
insurance institutions. 
  Cooperative Finance Supervision Department (overseeing rural credit cooperatives 
and rural commercial banks). This department handles the day-to-day supervision of 
credit cooperative institutions, including rural commercial banks and rural credit 
cooperatives. 
2.2  Financial Supervision in Hong Kong, China 
The financial regulatory structure in Hong Kong, China is best described as having an 
institutional approach (Figure 2). There are four principal regulators in Hong Kong, China: the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA); the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC); the 
Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI); and the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes 
Authority (MPFA). These institutions are responsible for regulating their respective industries 
of banking, securities and futures, insurance, and retirement schemes. 
Figure 2: The Financial Regulatory Structure in Hong Kong, China 
 
Source：G30 (2009). 
In 1992, as Hong Kong, China prepared for its transition into a Special Administrative Region 
of the PRC, the government began enacting measures to maintain the stability of the country’s 
monetary and financial systems. It amended the Exchange Fund Ordinance, to enable the 
Exchange Fund to be used by the Financial Secretary to maintain the stability and integrity of 
monetary and financial systems. At that time, banking supervision was conducted by the 
Office of the Commissioner of Banking. To assist the Financial Secretary in achieving the 
statutory monetary policy objectives, it was decided that the Financial Secretary would be ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
  9 
given the power to appoint a person to serve as the Monetary Authority, and that the Office of 
the Commissioner of Banking would be merged with the Office of the Exchange Fund to 
create the HKMA (with the Monetary Authority as its chief executive).  
The HKMA is accountable to the people of Hong Kong, China through the Financial Secretary, 
and through laws passed by the Legislative Council to set out the Monetary Authority’s powers 
and responsibilities. The HKMA’s Chief Executive appears  before the Panel on Financial 
Affairs of the Legislative Council three times a year, to brief Members and answer questions 
on the HKMA’s work. Representatives from the HKMA occasionally attend Legislative Council 
Panel meetings to explain and discuss particular issues; they also attend Committee meetings 
to assist Members in their scrutiny of draft legislation. 
The operating and staff costs of the HKMA are charged to the Exchange Fund. The Exchange 
Fund derives most of its income from its investment activities, although revenue also accrues 
from license fees paid by authorized institutions (AIs), rental payments from tenants, and 
custodian and transaction fees from users of the HKMA’s Central Money Markets Unit. The 
HKMA is accountable to the Financial Secretary. The HKMA’s annual budget and strategic 
plan are approved by the Financial Secretary on the advice of the Exchange Fund Advisory 
Committee (EFAC), and a number of the HKMA’s powers are exercisable only after 
consultation with the Financial Secretary. 
The HKMA may be described as a de facto central bank, in that it has the policy objectives of 
maintaining currency stability within the framework of the linked exchange rate system; 
managing the Exchange Fund; promoting the stability and safety of the banking system; and 
maintaining the development of the financial infrastructure. 
Promoting the safety and stability of the banking system through the regulation of banking and 
deposit-taking businesses and the supervision of AIs is a primary function of the HKMA. This 
responsibility is shared among three departments: 
  the Banking Supervision Department, which handles the day-to-day supervision of 
AIs; 
  the Banking Policy Department, which formulates supervisory policies to promote the 
safety and soundness of the banking sector; and 
  the Banking Development Department, which formulates policies to promote the 
development of the banking industry. 
Using the CAMELs approach, the HKMA evaluates the capital and risk levels of AIs, including 
various non-credit risks such as interest rate risk in the balance sheet, liquidity risk, and 
reputation and strategic risks. This  approach was further refined in  2008, in light of 
implementation experience and lessons drawn from the global financial crisis. The 
assessment of some risk factors was enhanced, such as credit concentration risk, liquidity ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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risk, corporate governance, and system controls. The supervisory review of AIs involves on-
site examinations, off-site reviews, prudential meetings, meetings with boards of directors, co-
operation with external auditors, and sharing of information with other supervisors. The 
HKMA’s aim is to ensure that any problems affecting authorized institutions are detected and 
addressed at an early stage. 
In addition, the HKMA carries out the day-to-day administration of the Deposit Protection 
Scheme (DPS) on behalf of an independent Deposit Protection Board, whose functions are 
confined to the assessing and collecting contributions, investing funds, and paying 
compensation to depositors in the event of a bank failure. 
 
2.3  Financial Supervision in Singapore 
Singapore has an integrated financial regulatory structure, under which the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore (MAS) has the authority to regulate the banking, securities, futures, and 
insurance industries (Figure 3). The MAS is also Singapore’s central bank, created by an Act 
of Parliament in 1970. Before the establishment of the MAS,  monetary functions were 
performed by various government departments and agencies. However, the demands of an 
increasingly complex banking and monetary environment necessitated the streamlining of 
functions to facilitate the development of a more dynamic and coherent policy on monetary 
matters. 
 
Figure 3: The Financial Regulatory Structure in Singapore 
 
Source：G30 (2009).  
In 1977, in a continuing effort to streamline various financial sectors, the government decided 
to bring the regulation of the insurance industry under the control of the MAS. The regulatory 
functions under the Securities Industry Act enacted in 1973 were also transferred to the MAS 
in 1984. In 1986, the Futures Trading Act was implemented and administered by the MAS. In ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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2002, Singapore’s Board of Commissioners of Currency merged with the MAS to rationalize 
central banking. Since then, the MAS has been the authority responsible for monetary and 
exchange policies promoting the growth and stability of the economy. 
The MAS board of directors is composed of a chairperson and four to nine directors. The 
chairperson  is appointed by the president of Singapore, upon the recommendation of the 
cabinet. The directors are appointed by the president. No one hailing from any financial 
institution licensed by the MAS may be appointed as a MAS director. A managing director, 
appointed by the president from one of the current directors, is responsible for the day-to-day 
administration of the MAS. 
The  board is responsible for policymaking  and general administration of the affairs and 
business of the MAS. It informs the government of regulatory, supervisory, and monetary 
policies. The MAS has operational autonomy, although the board remains accountable to the 
Parliament. 
As the integrated supervisor of the financial services sector, the MAS conducts risk-based 
supervision of financial institutions. This includes authorization or licensing of financial 
institutions to offer financial services; setting regulatory rules and standards; and taking 
actions against institutions and individuals for regulatory breaches. The MAS also monitors the 
financial system to identify emerging trends and potential vulnerabilities, in order to guide and 
support its regulatory activities. 
The Prudential Supervision  Department  in the MAS is mainly responsible for banking 
supervision. It is composed of five departments, with the following responsibilities: 
(1) Banking Supervision Department. The Banking Supervision Department (BD) is 
responsible for the licensing and supervision of banks, merchant banks, and finance 
companies. The department helps foster the stability and strength of Singapore's 
financial system by monitoring the safety and soundness of banks and other 
institutions under their supervision, and actively promotes the adoption of international 
best practices in corporate governance and risk management. 
(2) Insurance Supervision Department. The Insurance Supervision Department (ID) 
administers the Insurance Act and has the primary objective of protecting 
policyholders' interests. The ID adopts a risk-based approach to the prudential and 
market conduct supervision of insurance companies. The ID carries out its 
responsibilities by way of both on- and off-site supervision, and works with foreign 
supervisors as part of a holistic supervisory approach. In its standards development 
role, the ID works closely with industry associations to promote the adoption of best 
practices. 
(3) Prudential Policy Department. The Prudential Policy Department (PPD) is responsible 
for formulating capital and prudential policies for banks, insurance companies, and ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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securities firms to promote a sound and dynamic financial sector. It works to achieve a 
more harmonized regulatory framework that will minimize regulatory arbitrage,  and 
facilitate a more integrated, risk-based supervisory approach. 
(4) Complex Institutions Supervision Department. The Complex Institutions Supervision 
Department (CI) is mainly responsible for the licensing and supervision of large 
domestic finance groups and branches of  foreign banks. The CI supervises local 
financial groups across banking, insurance, and securities activities. 
(5) Specialist Risk Supervision Department. The Specialist Risk Supervision Department 
(SRD) provides the financial and technology risk expertise necessary for MAS' 
supervisory and regulatory functions, and the assessment of individual institutions and 
system-wide risks. The SRD monitors developments and trends in the financial sector, 
and seeks effective and efficient approaches to mitigate identified  risks. It also 
oversees payment infrastructures with the objective of fostering their stability and 
efficiency. 
2.4  Financial Supervision in Taipei,China 
The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in Taipei,China was established on 1 July 2004 
to promote integrated financial supervision. The Commission consolidates the supervision of 
banking, securities, and insurance sectors, and acts  as a single regulator for all of these 
industries. The establishment of the FSC signifies more than just the transfer or consolidation 
of financial regulation; it represents the birth of a new service-driven culture of financial 
supervision in Taipei,China. 
The newly established FSC functions as a quasi-independent agency that directly reports to 
the Executive Yuan. The Commission’s responsibilities include supervision, examination, and 
inspection of the financial market. The FSC is headed by nine commissioners, including the 
chairperson and two vice chairpersons. All the commissioners are nominated by the Premier 
to the President for appointment.  
The FSC includes four bureaus and five supporting departments (Figure 4). The Banking 
Bureau, the Securities and Futures Bureau, and the Insurance Bureau are responsible for 
supervising financial institutions. The Examination Bureau is in charge of examining financial 
institutions, and consists of examination staff from the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation. This has provided better administrative and 
human resources for conducting financial examination under one agency. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 4: The Financial Regulatory Structure in Taipei,China 
*Central Bank of Taipei,China 
  *Financial Supervisory 
Commission 
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The Banking Bureau is mainly responsible for banking supervision and ensuring the stability 
and safety of the banking industry. The organization of the Banking Bureau includes the Legal 
Regulation Division, Domestic Banks Division, Credit Cooperatives Division, Trust and Bills 




3.  IMPACT OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL ON 
COMMERCIAL BANKS  
3.1  Impact of the Financial Turmoil on Commercial Banks in the 
PRC 
As of the end of 2008, financial institutions in the PRC—including banks and non-banks—
consisted of 3 policy banks, 5 large state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint stock commercial 
banks, 136 city commercial banks, 22 rural commercial banks, 163 rural cooperative banks, 
22 city credit cooperatives, 4,965 rural credit cooperatives, 1 postal savings bank, 4 financial 
asset management companies, 32 locally incorporated foreign bank subsidiaries, 54 trust 
companies, 84 finance companies of enterprise groups, 12 financial leasing companies, 3 
                                                 
3 Available at http://oldwww.fsc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=508411&ctNode=2217&mp=5 ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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monetary brokers firms, 9 auto financing companies, 91 village and township banks, 6 lending 
companies, and 10 rural mutual credit cooperatives. 
In 2008, there were noticeable changes in the market shares of banking institutions (Figure 5). 
Measured by asset scale, the three largest banking institutions were large state-owned 
commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks, and rural cooperative financial institutions. In 
2008, the market shares by asset scale of these three types of banking institutions were 
51.0%, 14.1%, and 11.5%, respectively. The market shares of large state-owned commercial 
banks and foreign bank subsidiaries were reduced by 2.22% and 0.23%, while those of the 
policy banks, rural cooperative financial institutions, joint stock commercial banks and postal 
savings bank increased by 0.92%, 0.81%, 0.34% and 0.19%, respectively. On the other hand, 
there was a rise in the market shares by asset scale of other institutions. 
Figure 5: Market Share (by assets) of Banking Institutions in the PRC 
 
Source：CBRC (2009). 
The impact of the current financial turmoil  on PRC’s investments in security and relevant 
derivatives  in  the US and  the EU may be observed from three dimensions: government’s 
investment in the US government’s bonds; financial institutions’ investment in corporate bonds; 
and strategic overseas investments by the main state-owned banks.  
According to estimates by the PRC media, Asian financial institutions incurred total losses 
amounting to approximately US$24  billion as a result of the financial crisis, with Japan 
suffering the biggest loss. Chinese financial institutions, meanwhile suffered a loss of about 
US$3.1 billion. 
The Report on Situation of Oversea Holding America Securities (issued by American Finance 
Ministry and Federal Reserve System at the end of April 2009), estimated that PRC’s total 
holdings of US stocks, bonds, and asset-backed securities (ABS) was US$1,174.8 billion at ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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the  end of June 2008.  This was second only to Japan’s holdings, which amounted to 
US$1,184.8 billion. Of the US$375.7 billion in ABS holdings, around US$368.7 billion were 
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Table 6).  
Table 6: Value of Foreign Holdings of US Long-term Securities, by Asian Country and 
Type of Securities (as of 30 June 2008) 
  Million US$  
  Economy  
Long term 
Securities (include 
stock, long term 
government bond, 
agency bond and 
corporate bond) 
ABS  Agency 
ABS  Corporate ABS 
Japan  1,184,814  162,869  121,018  41,851 
PRC  1,174,798  375,676  368,721  6,955 
Singapore  155,953  12,834  2,878  9,956 
Taipei,China  147,398  36,736  36,169  567 
Hong Kong, China  130,554  18,725  8,776  9,949 
Korea   120,885  24,357  20,626  3,731 
Malaysia  34,098  11,973  10,576  1,397 
Thailand  16,446  49  28  21 
India  16,604  2  2  Less than 0.5 
Indonesia  10,509  20  20  Less than 0.5 
Philippines  14,185  63  63  Less than 0.5 
Total Asia  3,363,042  676,088  587,452  88,636 
   
UK  840,355  89,872  16,015  73,857 
Total Europe  3,795,611  515,494  103,945  411,549 
Source：US Treasury Department 2009b. 
According to these statistics,  PRC  financial institutions suffered limited foreign security 
investment losses as a result of the global financial turmoil. The main reasons for this could be 
summarized as follows: 
(1)  Financial openness was still far lower than the global average level. Overall system 
risks were therefore kept under control. 
(2)  Funds remained in surplus and overall liquidity risk was low. 
(3)  Direct and indirect financial systems in PRC are not fully integrated. As such, the 
high leverage ratio of derivatives does not exist in the financial market. 
(4)  Reforms of large commercial banks significantly improved their asset quality. Banks’ 
corporate governance and management ability also continue to improve. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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(5)  Foreign  exchange  reserves rose to US$2.1 trillion in July 2009, allowing PRC to 
absorb overseas investment losses. 
Major commercial banks in PRC also suffered lower investment losses compared to US and 
EU  derivatives  or  securities. For example, risk exposure in the China Construction Bank 
peaked at US$17.814 billion in September 2008, accounting for less than 2% of total assets. 
Direct risk exposure in other PRC commercial banks listed in Hong Kong, China was also kept 
under control (Table 7).  
Table 7: US Related Derivatives Holdings of Major Commercial Banks in PRC, Third 
Quarter of 2008 












(%)  FNMA 
FHLMC 




BOC  6.2  3.3  5.7  0  15.2  1.6  2.1  24 
CCB  17.4  0.2  0  0.2  17.8  1.7  0.9  7 
ICBC  1.8  1.2  0.6  0.2  3.7  0.3  1.4  10.2 
CITIC  1.2  0  0  0  1.2  0.8  0.1  6 
CMB   0  0  0  0  0  0  0.1  2.8 
Total  26.6  4.7  6.3  0.4  38      4.5     
Source：Wealth Invest Weekly (2009).  
The impact of the financial turmoil on the PRC banking industry was assessed in the 2008 
Annual Report issued by CBRC. The report noted that the net profit (after-tax) of the banking 
industry in 2008 was CNY583.4 billion, an increase of 30.6% from 2007. The net return on 
assets (ROA) was 17.1%; this was the highest figure in the global banking industry. Net 
interest income, investment returns, and net fee-based income constituted the three major 
contributors to the income portfolio (Figure 6). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 6: Profit Distribution of Major Commercial Banks in the PRC 
 
Source: CBRC (2009). 
The overall weighted average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) stood at 12% by the end of 2008. 
This was higher than the 8.3% registered at the end of 2007. The number of banks which met 
the CAR requirement of 8% reached 204, higher by 43 compared to 2007. There was only 
one bank with a CAR below the  statutory minimum. The assets of these qualified banks 
accounted for 99.9% of the total assets of commercial banks, up by 20.9% from the end of 
2007. 
The banking industry's overall liquidity remained stable at the end of 2008. The overall loan-to-
deposit ratio of banking institutions was 69.2%, which was 5.8% lower than regulatory ceiling 
of 75% (Figure 7). The liquidity ratio stood at 50.07%, up by 9.9% from the beginning of the 
year (Figure 8). The excess reserve ratio was 5.6%, up by 2.6% during the same period. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 8: Liquidity Condition of Major Commercial Banks in the PRC,  
January to December 2008 
 ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Source：CBRC (2009). 
Due to the financial turmoil, the provision for asset impairment set aside by major commercial 
banks totaled CNY $773.5 billion in 2008, an increase of 174.7 billion from the previous year. 
The provision coverage ratio also increased by 75.2% to 114.4%. The banking industry had 
thus enhanced their resilience to risks. 
3.2  The Impact of the Financial Turmoil on Commercial Banks in 
Hong Kong, China 
As a result of the global financial crisis, the profit of banks in Hong Kong,  China was 
significantly lower in 2008 than in 2007. Many retail banks registered a significant reduction in 
profits in 2008. The aggregate pre-tax operating profits of retail banks fell by 35.7% in 2008 
compared to 2007. 
The net interest margin (NIM) of retail banks fell to 1.84% in 2008, compared to 1.90% in 
2007. Measured on a quarterly annualized basis, however, the NIM of retail banks rebounded 
from 1.75% in the third quarter of 2008 to 1.78% in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Figure 9). 
The non-interest income of retail banks declined due to trading investment losses and lower 
income from fees and commissions. The cost-to-income ratio of retail banks climbed up to 
45.1% in 2008, from 40.5% in 2007. 
Figure 9: Retail Banks’ Net Interest Margin in Hong Kong, China (quarterly annualized) 
 
Source：HKMA (2009b). 
Impairment charges increased significantly in 2008 as the economic and financial environment 
deteriorated. Net charges for debt provisions surged to HK$10.7 billion in 2008 from HK$2.1 ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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billion in 2007. Net charges for other provisions, mostly related to impairment allowances for 
securities holdings, tripled to HK$14.6 billion from roughly HK$4.4 billion in 2007. 
Investments by retail banks in debt securities, which were classified as “substandard”, 
“doubtful” or “loss”, stood at 0.06% of the banks’ assets by the end of December 2008. Debt 
securities investments classified as “special mention” increased to 0.39% of banks’ assets in 
the same period, from 0.31% by the end of September 2008. 
The credit quality of retail banks’ loan portfolios deteriorated further in the last quarter of 2008. 
The ratio of overdue and rescheduled loans also increased to 0.68% from 0.55% by the end of 
September 2008 (Figure 10). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
  21 




As the financial crisis deepened after September 2008, banks generally became more 
cautious in lending. Total loans and advances of retail banks fell by 3.1% in the final quarter of 
2008. On the other hand, total customer deposits increased by 2.7% during the same period. 
The overall loan-to-deposit ratio of retail banks fell to 47.2% by the end of December 2008, 
from 50.1% by the end of September 2008 (Figure 11). The Hong Kong dollar loan-to-deposit 
ratio also fell to 69.4% from 72.9% during the same period. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 11: Hong Kong, China’s Retail Banks’ Total Loans and Customer Deposits 
 
Source：HKMA (2009b). 
In the final quarter of 2008, domestic lending (loans for domestic use plus trade finance) 
declined by 3.3% despite growing by 2.6% in the previous quarter. Trade finance lending fell 
significantly by 14.8% in the final quarter, following a decline of 2.5% in the previous quarter. 
This was apparently due to reduced trade activities. Loans for use outside Hong Kong, China 
decreased by 0.6% in the final quarter of 2008, after falling by 0.4% in the previous quarter 
(Figure 12). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 12: Loans and Advances of Retail Banks in Hong Kong, China 
 
Source：HKMA (2009b). 
Figure 13 shows that the quarterly average liquidity ratio of retail banks stood at 45% in the 
final quarter of 2008, well above the statutory minimum of 25%. 
Despite increased provisions for securities investments and bad and doubtful debts, the 
capital positions of locally incorporated AIs remained sound. Their consolidated CAR stood at 
14.8% by the end of December 2008, compared with 13.8% by the end of September 2008 
(Figure 14). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 13: Retail Banks’ Liquidity Ratio (Quarterly Average) 
 
Source：HKMA (2009b). 
Figure 14: Capital Adequacy Ratio of Locally Incorporated AIs 
 
Source：HKMA (2009b). 
Table 8 summarizes some key performance indicators of the banking industry in Hong Kong, 
China. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
  25 
Table 8: Key Performance Indicators of Hong Kong, China’s Banking Sector 
    Dec-07  Sep-08  Dec-08 
Asset quality 
Pass loans  97.59  97.61  96.57 
Special mention loans  1.57  1.43  2.19 
Classified loans (gross)  0.85  0.96  1.24 
Classified loans (net)  0.65  0.7  0.84 
Overdue>3 months and rescheduled 
loans 
0.57  0.55  0.68 
Profitability 
Bad debt charge as percentage of 
average total assets 
0.04  0.09  0.18 
Net interest margin  1.9  1.86  1.84 
Cost-to-income ratio    40.5  43.7  45.1 
   
Liquidity ratio (quarterly average)  51.9  42.9  45 
   
Capital adequacy ratio (consolidated)  13.4  13.8  14.8 
Source：HKMA (2009b). 
3.3  The Impact of the Financial Turmoil on Commercial Banks in 
Singapore 
As a result of the 2008 global financial crisis  and the subsequent decline in commercial 
activity,  the growth of Domestic Banking Units’ (DBU) non-bank loans is expected to fall. 
Spurred by robust economic growth in the first half of 2008, DBU non-bank loans accelerated. 
While property-related loans—namely loans to the building and construction (B&C) sector and 
housing—were the main drivers, a number of other sectors such as nonbank financial 
institutions (NBFI) and general commerce also contributed significantly to the growth in DBU 
non-bank loans. Despite the strong growth in property-related loans, the exposure of banks to 
the property sector remained within regulatory limits, and loan books remained well-
diversified. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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The banking system’s NPL ratio is at a historical low after a sustained period of buoyant 
growth in Singapore. The NPL ratio is expected to rise moderately as the economy slows 
further and loan delinquencies and defaults rise. Indeed, a slight rise has been seen in the 
overall NPL ratio, which rose from 0.9% in March of 2008 to 1% in September of 2008 (Figure 
15). 
Figure 15: Overall NPL Ratio in Singapore 
 
Source：MAS (2009) 
Thus far, the impact of the recent financial turmoil on local banks in Singapore has been 
contained because of their limited direct exposures to securities linked to US home 
mortgages, or to those distressed or failed financial institutions such as Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers. Local banks have yet to make large write downs. In November 2008, the 
allowances for their CDO portfolios totaled S$937 million, or around 10% of the banks’ 
operating profits in the past four quarters; this brought their outstanding CDO exposures down 
to less than 0.4% of total assets. 
Local banks are still focused primarily on commercial banking, with interest income accounting 
for four-fifths of gross income, even though they have been expanding  their investment 
banking and fee-based businesses over the years. Non-interest incomes such as trading, 
investment and fee incomes, which are more sensitive to market conditions, have also been 
adversely affected (Figure 16). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
  27 
Figure 16: Local Banks’ Profit Components in Singapore 
 
Source：MAS (2008). 
The impact on local banks has mainly been on share prices (Figure 17), reflecting the higher 
risk premium now required globally and the constrained earnings outlook. Share prices have 
fallen by about 50% from their highest levels this year, in line with the broader STI Index. 
Figure 17: Local Banks’ Share Prices and STI in Singapore 
 
Source：MAS (2008). 
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However, the local banks facing these risks remained strong, with high capital requirements. 
The average Tier 1 capital ratio in the third quarter of 2008 was 11.3%, well above the MAS’ 
minimum requirement of 6% and BIS’ recommendation of 4% (Figure 18). 
Figure 18: Local Banks’ CAR in Singapore 
 
Source：MAS (2008). 
In addition, local banks have healthy loan-to-deposit ratios, averaging 86% in the third quarter 
of 2008 (Figure 19). Having a stable retail deposit base as the primary source of funding 
implies that they rely minimally on wholesale funding. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 19: Local Banks’ Loan-to-Deposit Ratio in Singapore 
 
Source：MAS (2009). 
Table 9 summarizes the key performance indicators of the banking industry in Singapore.ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Table 9: Key Performance Indicators of Singapore’s Banking Sector 


















15.8  15.4  13.5  14.9  15  14  13.5  14.1  13.9  14.3 
Regulatory Tier I 
Capital to Risk-
Weighted Assets  
11.4  11.2  9.8  10.9  10.6  10.1  9.8  10.5  10.6  11.3 
Asset Quality (%) 
Nonbank NPLs to 
Nonbank Loans  
3.8  2.8  1.5  2.5  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Total Provisions to 
Non-Bank NPLs  
78.7  89.5  115.6  94.4  98.6  105.9  115.6  118.9  117.2  119.9 
Specific Provisions 
to Non-Bank NPLs  
41.1  41.3  39.9  42.7  39  38.7  39.9  38.8  41.4  43.5 
Loan Concentrations (% of Total Loans) 
Bank Loans   24.1  22.8  16.2  21.1  20.7  19.5  16.2  17.7  17.1  16.6 
Nonbank loans   75.9  77.2  83.8  78.9  79.3  80.5  83.8  82.3  82.9  83.4 
Of which to (% of Total Loans):  
Manufacturing   7.6  8.4  9.2  9  9.1  9.2  9.2  9.1  8.9  9.4 
Building & 
Construction  
8.8  9.5  11.4  9.5  10.1  10.2  11.4  12.1  12.3  12.3 
Housing   21.7  21  20.6  20.8  20.6  20.6  20.6  19.8  19.7  19.2 
Professionals & 
Private Individuals  
9.4  8.7  8.6  8.6  8.5  8.6  8.6  8.2  8.4  8.1 ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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1.2  1.4  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1 
ROE (Simple 
Average)  
11.2  13.7  12.9  13.8  14.1  13.4  12.9  12.2  12.5  11.9 
Net Interest Margin 
(Simple Average)  
1.9  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2 
Non-Interest Income 
to Total Income  
39  42.6  39.1  41.6  40.7  39.5  39.1  36.5  36.4  34.2 
Source：MAS (2008). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
 
32 
3.4  The Impact of the Financial Turmoil on Commercial Banks in 
Taipei,China 
The  subprime mortgage meltdown has had direct and indirect impacts on financial 
institutions in Taipei,China. Direct impacts mainly involve investments in overseas securities, 
and financial distress originating from financial institutions and derivatives. Since financial 
openness in Taipei,China  is  relatively  less  advanced, domestic financial institutions had 
limited exposure to derivatives or subprime investment securities. In addition, the loss in 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of related securities or structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs) is mostly written down in financial institutions. As such, the impact of the financial 
turmoil on Taipei,China’s financial institutions has been relatively mild. According to a press 
release issued by the Financial Supervisory Commission Executive Yuan on 29 July 2008, 
total subprime losses of financial institutions reached approximately NTD $42.572 billion. 
The impact on the insurance, bank, and security industries is summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10: Losses in Financial Institutions in Taipei,China from the US Subprime Crisis 
 
Items  Investment 
Amount  
billion NT$ 













related  43.98  10.65  0.03  7.19  17.86 
SIV  16.79  15.58  0.04  1.26  16.89 
Sub-total  60.77  －  －  －  34.17 
Insurance 
Subprime 
related  22.9  6.65  0.13  1.3  8.08 
SIV  1.29  0.27  0  0.04  0.32 
Sub-total  84.95  33.16  0.21  9.79  42.57 
＊ 0.58 billion in total losses from subprime related products in banks is the same as in SIVs; total losses 
therefore amount to 34.17 billion.  
＊ Data was recorded through 2008/05. 
Source：FSC (2008). 
The indirect impact of the financial turmoil is mainly reflected in the operating performance of 
banks and insurers. In addition to dealing with the double shock of financial turmoil and 
economic recession, local banks also had to contend with an increase in default in enterprise 
loans.  Moreover, due to a steady decrease in the  NIM, incremental insurance reserves 
increased the operating cost of insurers. 
The capital structure and operating performance of Taipei,China banks can be described as 
follows: 
Weak fundamentals in financial holding companies. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
Taipei,China established the financial resolution trust corporation fund (RTC) to deal with 
problematic financial institutions.  In  1999,  Taipei,China  also  adopted  policies aimed at 
decreasing  the  deposit reserve ratio, increasing the payment of deposit reserve, and 
decreasing the financial business tax by 3%. These were intended to help banks solve the 
NPL problem. Due to these policies, the fundamentals of Taipei,China banks have improved.  
Compared with the state of banking systems in Europe and US after the financial turmoil, the 
fundamentals of Taipei,China’s banks are relatively sound. However, the fundamentals of 
financial holding companies have not been as robust as previously thought. This problem 
has two aspects.  First, owing to the Second  Financial  Reform,  several  private financial ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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holding companies combined with private funds from abroad to merge with other financial 
holding company and state-owned banks. These private funds have been affected by the 
financial crisis, subsequently affecting the capital structure of financial holding companies. 
Second, because insurance subsidiaries of financial  holding companies  suffered  from 
investment losses in domestic and foreign security markets, their capital structure has also 
been  affected.  As such, even though Taipei,China’s  financial system remains  relatively 
sound, capital quality in some large  private financial holding  companies  may have been 
compromised by the financial crisis. 
Decrease in banking profitability. The liberalization of the banking sector in Taipei,China 
has  allowed many homogenous competitors  to  enter the banking industry  within a short 
period of time.  Banking  business, however,  has not expanded at  the  same  speed. 
Confronted with a limited savings and loan market, competition between old and new banks 
has  become  even more intense.  Faced with the environment of excessive competition, 
banks began adopting price competition measures—such as reducing the lending rate—to 
ensure a stable growth in  loan business and increase market share.  The  NIM  between 
deposits and loans in banks gradually shrank. From 2000 to 2008, the NIM decreased from 
2.99% to 1.5%. After tax and deposit reserves, the actual NIM was less than 1.5%. The NIM 
level in Taipei,China is obviously too low.  
In addition, aggressive expansion by and competition among banks created  overlaps  in 
inter-banking business. Profits were limited and the market share of more than half of the 
banks was less than 1%. To expand market share, banks intensified financial marketing, 
such as increasing service quality and reducing fees. This approach increased costs and 
reduced actual profit. Although the establishment of new banks reinvigorated Taipei,China’s 
financial market, it also weakened the profitability of banks. 
Table 11 shows both the ROA and ROE of domestic banks in Taipei,China, which have 
tended to decrease over time. According to statistics from the Central Bank, domestic banks 
as a whole posted a net income before tax of NT$34.4 billion in 2008, a decrease of 55.68% 
on a year-on-year basis. The net income before tax of domestic banks in the first quarter of 
2009 was NTD $19.2 billion, a decline of 21.79% compared with the first quarter of 2008. 
Table 11: ROA and ROE of domestic banks in Taipei,China 
Year  ROA(%)  ROE(%) 
2000  0.48  6.19 
2001  0.27  3.6 
2002  -0.48  -6.93 
2003  0.22  3.52 
2004  0.63  10.3 
2005  0.3  4.81 
2006  -0.03  -0.43 
2007  0.14  2.21 
2008  0.16  2.47 
Jan-09  0.03  0.45 
Feb-09  0.04  0.69 
Mar-09  0.07  1.05 
Apr-09  0.07  1.19 
May-09  0.09  1.5 
Source：FSC Statistics. Available:”http://www.fscey.gov.tw/Layout/main_ch/BS_BSList.aspx?path=2566&Language=1 
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Figure 20 shows the revenue and cost structure of domestic banks in Taipei,China. 
Compared with 2007, the overall operating revenues of domestic banks declined by 13.15% 
in 2008. This was mainly due to an increase in investment losses stemming from sharp falls 
in the local and foreign stock markets, and continuously increasing provisions in investment 
positions associated with US subprime securities. On the one hand, the non-interest income 
of domestic banks fell dramatically, due primarily to the weakened financial market and 
increasing provisions for impairment losses on assets linked to the US subprime mortgage-
related products. However, net interest income, which is the primary source of operating 
revenues for domestic banks, leveled off due to a continued low interest rate spread 
between deposits and loans. On the cost side, although non-interest expenses rose in 2008 
as employee bonuses were recognized as expenses, total operating costs fell by 7.3% 
compared with 2007, as a result of a sharp decline in provisions. 
Figure 20: Composition of Income and Cost of Domestic Banks in Taipei,China 
 
Source：Central Bank of Taipei,China (2009). 
Small increase in the capital adequacy ratio of domestic banks. In the second half of 
2008,  a general reduction in  capital  was caused by the negative earnings of several 
domestic banks. Owing to some banks increasing their issuance of common stocks and 
subordinated bonds, the average capital adequacy ratio stood at 11.04% by the end of 2008, 
slightly higher than the 10.80% registered by the end of 2007 (Figure 21). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 21: Capital Adequacy Ratio of Domestic Banks in Taipei,China 
 
Source：Central Bank of Taipei,China (2009). 
Tier I capital, which features the best bearing capacity, accounted for 76.32% of domestic 
bank's eligible capital in 2008. Tier 2 capital accounted for 23.46%, while Tier 3 capital made 
up only 0.28%. The percentage of Tier I capital increased slightly by the end of 2008, while 
the shares of Tier 2 capital and Tier 3 declined slightly. 
Increase in overdue risk in domestic banks. The capital quality of domestic banks did not 
significantly worsen as a result of the financial crisis (Tables 12–14 and Figure 22). By the 
end of 2008, outstanding classified assets of domestic banks as a whole stood at NTD 
$612.3 billion, and the average classified asset ratio was 2.07%, increasing by 5.61% and 
0.02 %, respectively, compared with the end of June 2008. The outstanding NPL of domestic 
banks stood at NT $285.9 billion, and the average NPL ratio was 1.54%, up by 1.67% and 
0.02% when compared with the end of June and September 2007, respectively. The 
average NPL ratio increased steadily to reach 1.63% by the end of April 2009. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Table 12: NPL Ratio of Overall Banks and Domestic Banks in Taipei,China 
  Year   Overall (%)  Domestic banks (%) 
1996  4.15  3.7 
1997  4.18  3.71 
1998  4.93  4.37 
1999  5.67  4.88 
2000  6.2  5.34 
2001  8.16  7.48 
2002  6.84  6.12 
2003  5  4.33 
2004  3.28  2.78 
2005  2.19  2.24 
2006  2.08  2.13 
2007  1.79  1.84 
2008  1.52  1.54 
Jan-09  1.55  1.57 
Feb-09  1.59  1.61 
Mar-09  1.6  1.63 
Apr-09  1.6  1.63 




Table 13: Amount of Nonperforming Loans and Provision Coverage Ratio in 
Taipei,China 
Date  NPL (100 millions NT$)  Provision coverage 
ratio (%) 
Jun-08  2,812  67.35 
Jul-08  2,801  67.21 
Aug-08  2,802  67.75 
Sep-08  2,817  66.93 
Oct-08  2,863  66.12 
Nov-08  2,982  63.6 
Dec-08  2,851  69.48 
Jan-09  2,935  69.96 
Feb-09  2,896  68.97 
Mar-09  2,946  68.69 
Apr-09  2,933  68.52 
May-09  2,895  68.65 
Source：FSC Statistics. Available: 
http://www.fscey.gov.tw/Layout/main_ch/BS_BSList.aspx?path=2566&Language=1 ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Table 14: Key Performance Indicators of Taipei,China’s Banking Sector 
    2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Earnings and Profitability 
Return on 
assets (ROA) 
0.22  0.64  0.3  -0.06  0.28  0.12 
Return on 
equity (ROE) 




66.86  62.6  66.11  68.34  66.38  78.53 
Non  interest 
expenses to 
gross income 










loans to total 
loans 
6.08  3.82  2.24  2.15  1.83  1.54 
Provision 
coverage ratio 






10.29  10.87  11.23  10.87  10.8  11.04 
Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted 
assets 
10  10.25  10.37  9.88  8.5  8.43 
Liquidity 
Total deposits 
to total loans 





NA  NA  NA  NA  10.59  12.69 
Source：FSC (2009). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 22: Average NPL Ratio of Domestic Banks in Taipei,China 
 
Source: FSC (2009). 
With the rise in NPL in the fourth quarter of 2008, domestic banks raised loan loss provisions, 
and the NPL coverage ratio increased to 69.48% by the end of 2008. The loan loss reserve 
ratio increased to  1.07%,  indicating  that  domestic  banks  allowed for  more  loan loss 
provisions to cover possible losses in the future. 
As a whole, the capital quality of domestic banks  in  Taipei,China  appear  to be sound. 
However, the expected slowdown in domestic and global economic growth may weaken the 
financial health of the business sector and compromise  the repayment ability of the 
household sector, hence heightening credit risk.  
Funds have remained in surplus, while liquidity problems have eased in some banks. 
Due to a large amount of capital inflow from overseas, the deposit amounts of domestic 
banks in Taipei,China increased considerably in the second half of 2008. The annual growth 
rate in deposits reached 7.66% by the end of 2008. Meanwhile, the annual growth rate in 
loans slowed down to 3.83%, due mainly to more conservative lending. By the end of 2008, 
the deposit-to-loan ratio of domestic banks as a whole stood at 122.34%. The funding 
surplus (i.e. deposits exceeding loan demand) stood at NT $4.16 trillion, reflecting ample 
liquidity in domestic banks (Figure 23). This situation continued until the first quarter in 2009, 
when the deposit-to-loan ratio increased to 127.31%. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Figure 23: Deposit-to-Loan Ratio of Domestic Banks in Taipei,China 
 
Source：Central Bank of Taipei,China (2009). 
Figure 24  shows  the average NT dollar liquid reserve ratio of domestic banks in 
Taipei,China. The average NT dollar liquid reserve ratio of domestic banks rose to 22.70% in 
June 2008, well above the statutory minimum of 7%, and the reserve ratio of each bank was 
higher than 12%. This ratio  steadily rose to 25.43% in March 2009, suggesting that the 
quality of liquid assets remained satisfactory and that overall liquidity risk was decreasing.  
Figure 24: Liquid Reserve Ratio of Domestic Banks in Taipei,China 
 
Source: Central Bank of Taipei,China (2009). ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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4.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE AND THE CURRENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL 
The previous two sections showed that an integrated financial regulatory structure did not 
necessarily help commercial banks in the  PRC;  Hong  Kong,  China;  Singapore;  and 
Taipei,China mitigate the impact of the current global financial crisis. Although Singapore 
and  Taipei,China  operate under an integrated structure, banking performance in these 
economies were not better than in the PRC or Hong Kong, China, which have fragmented 
structures. 
In June 2009, both the US and EU proposed extensive financial regulatory reforms  in 
response to the global financial crisis. These countries also operate under fragmented 
regulatory structures The US proposal recommended the creation of a new federal 
government agency, the National Bank Supervisor (NBS), to conduct prudential supervision 
and regulation of all federally chartered depository institutions, and all federal branches and 
agencies of foreign banks. This agency would take over the prudential responsibilities of the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). This office currently charters and 
supervises nationally chartered banks, federal branches, and agencies of foreign banks, as 
well as holds responsibility for the institutions currently supervised by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), which supervises federally chartered thrifts and thrift holding companies. 
The Federal Reserve Bank will have greater power to oversee large financial institutions 
whose failures could threaten the stability of the entire financial system. Furthermore, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) was established to protect consumers of 
credit, savings, payment, and other consumer financial products and services, as well as 
regulate providers of such products and services. 
Securities and options are regulated by the SEC, while futures contracts are regulated jointly 
by the CFTC and SEC. All advisers to hedge funds (and other private pools of capital, 
including private equity funds and venture capital funds) whose assets under management 
exceed a modest threshold, should be required to register with the SEC under the 
Investment Advisers Act. The advisers should then be required to report information on the 
funds they manage when it is sufficiently assessed that any fund poses a threat to financial 
stability.  
In June 2009, the European Commission put forward its framework proposal on Financial 
Supervision in Europe. The proposal covered a set of far-reaching reforms in the current 
architecture of supervisory committees, with the creation of a new European Systemic Risk 
Council (ESRC) and European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), composed of new 
European Supervisory Authorities. The ESRC would monitor and assess risks to the stability 
of the financial system as a whole ("macro-prudential supervision"). It would provide early 
warning of systemic risks that may be building up, and, if necessary, recommend actions to 
deal with these risks. The creation of the ESRC would address one of the fundamental 
weaknesses highlighted by the crisis: the exposure of the financial system to interconnected, 
complex, sectoral, and cross-sectoral systemic risks. The ESFS would supervise individual 
financial institutions ("micro-prudential supervision"), consisting of a robust network of 
national financial supervisors working in coordination with new European Supervisory 
Authorities. These would be created by the transformation of existing Committees for the 
banking, securities, insurance, and occupational pensions sectors. 
There is no clear evidence to support the argument that an integrated regulatory structure is 
beneficial to banking performance. But the blurring of boundaries between banking, 
securities, and insurance challenges traditional financial regulatory structures; Meanwhile, 
financial globalization and the development of derivatives have made  financial markets 
increasingly complicated. Thus, the traditional  financial regulatory structure has become 
inappropriate. In view of the impact of the financial crisis on the global financial market, 
greater cooperation in global financial supervision needs to be pursued.  ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Asian countries have adopted  a variety of supervisory structures. As reported in 
Masciandaro (2009), four of the 13 Asian countries operate under an integrated supervisory 
structure, while the remaining nine countries have fragmented structures.
4
Developing a regional supervision coordination framework for Asia can refer to the 
Lamfalussy Process in EU. Although this process has been the subject of recent criticism, it 
is still the most suitable model for pursuing Asian financial supervisory cooperation in its 
early stage.
 Similarly in 
Europe, fourteen of the 27 EU countries have adopted an integrated financial regulatory 
system, although they have implemented this in different ways. The remaining 13 countries 
have fragmented structures (Herring and Carmassi 2008).  
5
The recommendation for the Asian Lamfalussy Process is organized according to four levels 
that correspond to the usual policy cycle (Figure 25). The first level constitutes the initial 
phase of rulemaking, whereby the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue proposes regulations 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) decides on these proposals by the usual 
consensus.  The second level committees, composed of representatives from member 
countries will then be responsible for adopting specific technical rules to implement the 
framework legislation approved in Level 1. The third level committees, composed of 
representatives of member countries’ financial supervisory agencies, will oversee the 
consistent day-to-day enforcement of regulations, and will also be charged with drafting 
implementing powers for decisions reached in Level 2. Finally, monitoring of transposition 
will be done in the fourth level by the Asian Development Bank.  
  

































                                                 
4 According to the Financial Supervision Unification Index in Masciandaro (2009), Australia, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, and Singapore have integrated financial supervisory systems, while PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; 
Malaysia; New Zealand; Pakistan; Philippines; Sri Lanka; and Thailand have fragmented structures.  
5 A discussion on the Lamfalussy Process can be found in Kudrna (2009).  ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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In order to implement the Asian Lamfalussy Process, communication and coordination at the 
regional level need to be strengthened. East Asian countries should set up an Asian 
Financial Stability Dialogue, made up of  finance ministry officials, central bankers, and 
financial market regulators and supervisors to facilitate policy coordination for financial 
stability and development. The Asian Financial Stability Dialogue could  propose a set of 
ambitious reforms to the regional architecture of financial services committees, with the 
creation of a new Committee of Asian Banking Supervisors (CABS), Committee of Asian 
Securities and Futures Supervisors (CASFS), and Committee of Asian Insurance and 
Pensions Supervisors (CAIPS).  
The recommendations that should  addressed by the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
include: 
Managing short-term international capital flows. The current global financial turmoil has 
shifted attention back to problems caused by capital flows. The crisis has revived calls for a 
fundamental reform of the international financial architecture, revolving around proposals for 
international institutions designed to regulate and stabilize international capital flows. A 
starting point would be for the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue to discuss measures to 
manage short-term capital inflows, particularly when financial markets become euphoric and 
inflows are excessive. Such measures will be more effective if coordinated at the regional 
level. 
Establishing a foreign exchange market coordination framework. The eight member 
countries in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) are currently sitting on nearly US$ 4 trillion in 
foreign exchange reserves. Asian countries can enhance the CMI and its effectiveness to 
achieve a stable foreign exchange market in Asia. For example, ASEAN, PRC, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea agreed in Feb. 2009 to multilateralize the CMI and use the swaps to 
carry out US$120 billion in foreign reserves coordination. 
Strengthening the infrastructure of financial markets and financial products.  East 
Asian governments should ensure that the settlement, legal, and operational infrastructure 
for financial markets and financial products is sound. The Financial Stability Forum (2008) 
has suggested that regulators should promote central counterparty clearing (CCP)
 of over-
the-counter derivatives to reduce the loss from a major dealer's
 failure. CCP clearing also 
reduces the risk of legal disputes
 from unconfirmed trades. By standardizing and automating 
the
 clearing process, CCP clearing prevents confirmation backlogs. 
 Enhancing transparency and risk management. Regulators should encourage banks to 
increase transparency through more regular and timely reporting of liquidity, profitability, and 
capital key indicators, as well as their exposure to developed country counterparties. Given 
the opaqueness of complex derivative products and a lack of clarity about risk accountability, 
it is essential to strengthen financial system transparency. Accordingly, authorities should 
encourage greater disclosure of complex financial products and ensure the “complete and 
accurate disclosure” of financial conditions by firms. Regulatory standards for liquidity risk 
management need to be strengthened, particularly for banks that rely heavily on capital 
market funding. Authorities need to ensure that regulated financial institutions have proper 
liquidity risk management frameworks, and formulate contingency plans to deal with a 
disruption in external financing. Close attention is needed to ensure that local banks are 
properly classifying loans and adequately provisioning against problem loans. 
Strengthening financial institution capitalization. Regulators should encourage banks to 
immediately start raising capital to strengthen capital requirement ratios well above 
prudential norms. This would send a clear signal to the market that banks are entering the 
downturn from a position of strength rather than weakness. In the current environment of 
uncertainty, regulators may signal that systemically important financial institutions will not be 
allowed to fail. Precautionary public recapitalization schemes should also be ready where 
appropriate. However, public recapitalization should be approached with the primary aim of ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
43 
strengthening the financial system and promoting needed adjustments, rather than 
protecting individual institutions or shareholders. 
Alleviating a credit crunch. In the extreme case of a credit crunch, authorities should 
undertake measures to prevent a downward spiral from feeding into the real sector. 
Providing guarantees on new lending might be a first option, if bank balance sheets and 
liquidity positions remain sound and the pullback is the result of excessive risk aversion. In 
addition, credit can be supplied directly to the real economy, either through the public sector 
buying financial instruments issued by firms or through central bank credit extensions. 
Avoiding a credit crunch for SMEs, which typically have more difficulty accessing finance 
even in the boom time, is an important task. To address SMEs’ funding constraints, it may 
be desirable to establish a regional loan facility to expedite funding. Providing support for 
trade credit is also critical to prevent further trade contractions. 
Reforming rating agencies. The role of global rating agencies in contributing to the current 
financial crisis needs to be assessed. More specifically, there is a need to review the 
revenue source of rating agencies and the ways in which ratings are used. 
The Financial Stability Forum (2008) has  recommended ways  to  enhance the level of 
information provided to support structured finance ratings; improve the assessment of 
underlying data quality; and increase discipline in the rating of new products. The report also 
highlighted the work of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 
setting standards to enhance the quality and integrity of the rating process. In 2008, IOSCO 
updated the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (the IOSCO Code), 
to address the additional concerns raised by the rating process for structured finance 
products. The updated IOSCO Code contains provisions to promote enhanced internal 
conduct of business controls; address concerns over conflicts of interest in the rating of 
structured finance products; drive more robust assessment of data quality used to produce 
ratings; and create greater transparency in the methodologies and limitations of credit 
ratings. 
The US SEC and the Committee of European Securities Regulators recently proposed new 
rules for credit rating agencies. These proposals strongly reflect the new provisions of the 
IOSCO Code and the recommendations of the FSF. Asian leaders should also encourage 
sound development and promote the improvement of regional rating agencies, so that 
regional and global investors can efficiently choose the best investment opportunities in the 
region. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper describes the current status of financial regulatory structures in the PRC; Hong 
Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China, particularly in banking supervision. It notes that 
financial regulatory structures in Singapore and Taipei,China  have integrated financial 
regulatory structures, while the PRC and Hong Kong, China  have traditional fragmented 
structures. Based on financial indicators of capital structure and operating performance in 
the greater PRC during the period 2003–2008, the results do not show that the banking 
performance under an integrated structure was better than performance under fragmented 
regulation. 
This finding is not only consistent with evidence from the literature, it is also supported by 
actual experience with financial regulatory reform in the US and the EU. In June of 2009, 
although the Federal Reserve was given greater power to oversee large financial institutions 
in the US, the financial regulatory structure retained its traditional fragmented structure. The 
newly created National Bank Supervisor (NBS), is mainly responsible for regulating federally 
chartered depository institutions. The SEC is mainly responsible for overseeing securities 
and some derivatives. In the EU, there are two new institutions: the European Systemic Risk ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Council (ESRC) and European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), to be composed of 
new European Supervisory Authorities. 
There is no evidence to support the claim that an integrated regulatory structure is beneficial 
to banking sector performance. However, the traditional financial regulatory structure is 
being challenged by the blurring of boundaries between banking, securities, and insurance. 
Meanwhile, greater financial globalization and the development of derivatives have made 
financial systems  increasingly complicated.  Greater  cooperation in global financial 
supervision therefore needs to be pursued. Given the current situation in Asia, Asian 
financial supervisory cooperation could follow the Lamfalussy Process adopted by the EU.  
 ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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APPENDIX 1. DEFINITIONS OF THE INDICATORS 
1.  Loan-to-deposit ratio:  
This ratio uses the total amount of a bank’s loans as the numerator and the amount 
of its deposits at any given time as the denominator. The higher the ratio, the more 
the bank relies on borrowed funds, which are generally more costly than other types 
of deposits. 
 
2.  Liquidity ratio: 
The liquidity ratio is the cash held by a bank as a proportion of the deposits of the 
bank. The liquidity ratio measures the extent to which a corporation or other entity 
can quickly liquidate assets and cover short-term liabilities. It is therefore of interest 
to short-term creditors. 
 
3.  Capital adequacy ratio (CAR): 
CAR is a measure of a bank’s capital. It is expressed as a percentage of a bank’s risk 





4.  Nonperforming Loan (NPL) ratio: 
The NPL ratio measures the proportion of total loans that are classified as bad or as 
nonperforming, due to the failure of the borrower to meet interest or principal 





5.  Return on Assets (ROA): 
This is an indicator of how profitable a bank is relative to its total assets. ROA 
provides an idea of management’s efficiency at using assets to generate earnings. It 
is calculated by dividing a company’s annual earnings by its total assets. ROA is 





6.  Return on Equity (ROE): 
ROE measures a bank’s profitability by revealing how much profit a bank 
generates with the money that shareholders have invested. ROE is expressed as a 
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APPENDIX 2. RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL  FINANCIAL 
CRISIS IN HONG  KONG,  CHINA;  PRC;  AND 
SINGAPORE
6
1. Hong Kong, China, and the PRC  
 
In mid-2007, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) began closely monitoring the 
impact of the US subprime mortgage crisis on the domestic banking system. The HKMA 
increased the monitoring both of authorized institutions’ (AI) direct and indirect exposure to 
the problem institutions and AIs’ liquidity positions, to ensure that they had adequate high-
quality assets to exchange for liquidity in emergencies. The HKMA also implemented the 
following in response to the financial crisis: 
(1) Performed regular stress tests to assess whether retail banks had adequate capital 
to withstand significant losses, should financial markets deteriorate further. 
(2) Stepped up its internal readiness for triggering “Lender-of-Last-Resort” support if 
needed, and adopted measures to ease liquidity tightness in the Hong Kong, China 
interbank market. 
(3) Established a new arrangement with the People’s Bank of China (PBC), whereby 
banks operating in the Mainland could obtain collateralized Renminbi liquidity from 
the PBC, with the collateral provided by the parent branch or headquarters in Hong 
Kong, China to the HKMA for safekeeping on behalf of the PBC.  
(4) Through the Financial Secretary, announced the use of the Exchange Fund to 
guarantee the repayment of customer deposits held with all AIs, beginning 14 
October 2008 until the end of 2010, following the principles of the existing Deposit 
Protection Scheme. 
(5) Established the “Contingent Bank Capital Facility” to provide locally incorporated 
licensed banks with access to additional capital, should this become necessary. 
(6) Facilitated the provision of collateralized lending  to individual banks in need of 
liquidity through or outside the Discount Window, through a number of temporary 
measures. 
(7) Issued Exchange Fund paper to meet the market demand of banks for liquidity 
management. 
(8) Issued a statutory guideline on 24 October 2008, explaining the approach being 
adopted in the enhancing of the monitoring of AIs’ activities, to prevent any potential 
moral hazard arising from the introduction of the full deposit guarantee and 
“Contingent Bank Capital Facility.” 
(9) Instituted new, semi-yearly surveys of off-balance sheet exposures and debt 
securities portfolios to strengthen the overseeing of AIs’ holdings of debt securities 
and their exposures to structured credit products or related off-balance sheet entities. 
(10)  Announced on 26 March 2009  that it would incorporate foreign-exchange 
swap arrangements and term repurchase arrangements into its market operations, to 
offer Hong Kong dollar liquidity assistance to banks. 
In summary, the HKMA implemented various liquidity-assistance policies to ensure that the 
banking system in Hong Kong, China had a high level of capitalization, prudent risk 
management, and ample liquidity, and that local banks had healthy leverage levels. The 
exposure of the banking sector to subprime-related assets is not  significant. This 
arrangement will ease any yuan  liquidity pressure on PRC  branches and subsidiaries of 
banks in Hong Kong, China. However, the global economic downturn may increase the 
riskiness of potential borrowers, leading banks to tighten credit standards; this, in turn, will 
reduce the supply of loans and further weaken the economy. Fortunately, there are signs 
that the rate of decline in the US and Europe is easing, possibly giving way to positive 
                                                 
6 Policy actions in Hong Kong, China and Singapore are summarized in Table A.1. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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growth by the end of 2009. Overall, recent indicators in Hong Kong, China suggest that the 
local banking sector may have emerged from the global crisis relatively unscathed. 
2. Singapore 
Similar to the HKMA, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has implemented the 
following in response to the financial crisis: 
(1) Expanded access to “the Standing Facility.” The MAS introduced “the Standing 
Facility” in June 2006 to allow banks to improve day-to-day liquidity management by 
providing a direct channel through which to place excess funds with—or borrow 
from—the MAS. The Standing Facility helps to moderate intra-day volatility in 
overnight interbank rates and boost market confidence by assuring banks of liquidity 
in the banking system. In July 2008, the MAS announced that it would extend the 
Standing Facility to all participants of the new MAS Electronic Payment System. 
Moreover, the MAS extended the eligibility criteria of financial institutions for 
collateral if the need arises.  
(2) Established a US Dollar Swap Facility. In October 2008, the MAS joined a group of 
central banks (including the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of 
Japan), that have established temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap 
lines) with the US Federal Reserve (Fed). The Fed has established a total of 14 swap 
lines with major central banks worldwide. These swap lines were established to help 
improve liquidity conditions in global financial markets and to mitigate the spread of 
difficulty in obtaining US dollar funding. 
(3) Intensified prudential supervision of financial institutions.  The MAS intensified the 
supervision of financial institutions as signs of the subprime crisis emerged in early 
2007. Aside from regular discussions with the management, board, and auditors of 
financial institutions, the MAS continued dialogue with home and host regulators and 
head-office auditors of foreign bank branches. The MAS also emphasized the 
importance of stress testing as a tool for assessing potential risks to the soundness 
of financial institutions and stressed the need for measures to enhance the financial 
resilience of these institutions. As economic conditions rapidly deteriorated, the MAS 
increased the magnitudes of the stress parameters used in the industry stress test 
exercises. 
(4) Announced a government guarantee on deposits. In response to announcements of 
a  blanket government guarantee on deposits by jurisdictions in the region, on 16 
October 2008, Singapore announced a guarantee by the Singapore Government on 
the deposits of individuals and nonbank customers of banks licensed in Singapore. 
The guarantee, which will be in place until 31 December 2010, is backed by the 
Singaporean government’s S$150 billion reserves. 
In general, the MAS has taken various policy actions to ensure that the banking system in 
Singapore has a high level of capitalization, prudent risk management, ample liquidity, and a 
healthy leverage level of local banks. The banking institutions in Singapore are generally 
well capitalized, although loan losses are expected to rise. However,  Singapore remains 
vulnerable to a sharper-than-expected slowdown in consumption and investment activity in 
the global economy, as well as to a potential weakening of domestic demand. Fortunately, 
the policy actions taken by the authorities in both G20 and Asian countries have helped 
stabilize financial institutions and the global economy during the first half of 2009. Recent 
precautionary policies such as the deposit guarantee scheme, the US dollar swap line with 
the US Federal Reserve Board, and an expected package of supportive fiscal measures 
should help the banking system tide over this financial turmoil. ADBI Working Paper 221    Hsu and Liao 
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Table A1: Summary of Policy Actions taken in Hong Kong, China and Singapore 
Policy Action  Hong Kong, China  Singapore 
Ease monetary policy  Yes  Yes 
Introduce fiscal stimulus  Yes  Yes 
Liquidity assistance in local 
currency 
Yes  No 
Lend foreign exchange  Yes  Yes 
Expand deposit insurance  Yes  Yes 
Guarantee non-deposit liabilities  No  No 
Prepare bank capital injection  Yes  No 
Create demand for assets  No  No 
Impose short sale restrictions  Yes  Yes 
Relax mark to market rules  No  No 
Source：Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 2009. The international financial crisis: timeline, impact and policy 
responses in Asia and the Pacific. August 2009. Basel: BIS. 
 
 
 
 